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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JANA D. EDWARDS (ROSS) : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Civil No. 840735759 
Appellate No. 960548-CA 
vs. : 
Priority No. 15 
BRUCE C. EDWARDS, : 
Defendant/Appe11ant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review 
all final judgments and orders of the District Court 
involving domestic relations cases pursuant to 78-2a-3, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) and Rule 3 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. THE TRIAL COURT FOLLOWED CORRECT PROCEDURES WITH 
DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION. 
Standard of Appellate Review: 
Mixed issues of fact and law and the standard of 
review to be applied was thoroughly discussed in State v. 
1 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). In Pena, the Court said 
that at the most basic level, there were two different 
types of questions presented to a trial Court, questions 
of law and questions of fact. 
Factual questions are generally 
regarded as entailing the empirical, 
such as things, events, actions, or 
conditions happening, existing or 
taking place, as well as the 
subjective, such as state of mind. 
Legal determinations, on the other 
hand, are defined as those which are 
not of fact but are essentially of 
rules or principles uniformly applied 
to persons or similar qualities and 
status in similar circumstances. 
At 935. 
Findings of Fact are to be reviewed by an appellate 
Court under the clearly erroneous standard. For the 
appellate Court to find clear error, "it must decide that 
the factual findings made by the trial Court are not 
adequately supported by the record, resolving all 
disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
trial Court's determination". At 936. 
Determinations of law are to be reviewed for 
correctness. That means "the appellate Court decides the 
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the 
trial judge's determination of law". 
In Pena, the Court went on to discuss a third 
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category of determinations. That is whether a given set 
of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law. 
The Court concluded that there are some fact-legal 
questions which could result in a "some discretion" 
standard of review. 
The procedures followed by the Judge against whom an 
Affidavit for Disqualification is directed should be 
reviewed for correctness. The decision of the reviewing 
judge is a mixture of law and fact and should fall under 
the "some discretion" standard of review. 
Some of the points raised by defendant under this 
issue have not been adequately referenced in the record. 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires 
that issues raised on appeal must adequately cite the 
record or the issue will be summarily rejected. Koulis 
v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 746 P.2d 1182f 1184-1185 
(Utah App. 1987). 
2. THE COURT'S COMMENT CONCERNING PROSPECTIVE 
CONTEMPTUOUS BEHAVIOR WAS NOT A FINAL ORDER SUBJECT TO 
APPELLATE REVIEW. 
Standard of Appellate Review: 
Only final orders are subject to appellate review. 
The Court's comments to the defendant concerning his 
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failure to make future child support payments did not 
constitute a final order. Accordingly, no appeal should 
be permitted on this issue. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an appeal of the final judgment entered 
July 23, 1996 in the Second Judicial District Court of 
Davis County, the Honorable Rodney S. Page presiding. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
This is a divorce case with a long history of post-
divorce actions, many of which were the result of 
defendant's failure to pay child support as ordered. 
Those proceedings are detailed in the Statement of Facts. 
At a hearing on July 3, 1996, the Court considered the 
defendant's failure to pay child support as previously 
ordered, plaintiff's Petition to increase support and 
defendant's Affidavit to address problems regarding 
visitation. 
Prior to this hearing, defendant had been found in 
contempt for failing to comply with a prior order and was 
sentenced to three days in jail. 
Following the contempt finding, but prior to this 
hearing, defendant filed an Affidavit of Disqualification 
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claiming bias or prejudice on the part of Judge 
Rodney Page. Judge Page referred the matter to Judge 
Memmott pursuant to Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Judge Memmott ruled that the Affidavit was 
legally insufficient and returned the matter to Judge 
Page for hearing. 
III. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT. 
At the July 3, 1996 hearing, the Court ordered the 
defendant to make child support payments through the 
clerk of the court by the 5th day of each month and if 
the support was not deposited with the clerk by the 10th, 
a bench warrant would issue. The Court denied 
plaintiffs request to increase support. 
The Court also found the defendant in contempt once 
again for failure to pay child support on time. 
Defendant was sentenced to thirty days in jail which was 
stayed, contingent upon the defendant's payment of 
support as ordered. The Court also said that every month 
the defendant failed to make support would constitute a 
separate contempt. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case has a long history. The background and 
proceedings up to the July 3, 1996 hearing are relevant 
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in understanding the Judge's order and comments, as well 
as the decision regarding disqualification. 
The plaintiff initiated this divorce in June of 
1984. (R 1) There was a brief effort at reconciliation 
which failed and an Amended Complaint was filed in March, 
1985. (R 21) 
At an initial hearing held May 16, 1985, the 
plaintiff was awarded the temporary custody of the minor 
child subject to defendant's visitation rights and 
defendant was ordered to pay $105.00 per month as 
temporary child support. (R 36-38) 
Trial was held November 4, 1985 which included 
issues of custody and future support. Plaintiff was 
awarded custody. Defendant was delinquent in the 
temporary child support order and a judgment was entered. 
Defendant was ordered to continue child support at the 
rate of $105.00 per month, but the defendant was further 
ordered to provide income information to the Court and 
the matter was continued to February 6, 1986 for further 
re-examination of the amount of child support to be paid. 
(R 48-54) 
At the February 6, 1986 hearing, no further 
modifications were made to the amount of support, but 
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either party was given the right to refer the matter back 
to court at any time relative to the issue of support. 
(R 63) 
In March, 1987, the plaintiff filed her first post-
divorce Affidavit for Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt 
alleging, among other things, the defendants delinquency 
in child support. (R 65-69) 
At a hearing before the Commissioner on 
April 2, 1987, it was determined defendant was delinquent 
in his child support in the sum of $1,050.00 and a 
judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff. (R78) 
At a subsequent hearing on July 16, 1987, it was 
determined the defendant had paid the plaintiff some 
support, but was still delinquent. The Commissioner 
recommended a finding of contempt. (R 90) 
Another hearing was held before the Commissioner on 
November 12, 1987 pursuant to defendant's claims 
regarding visitation. At that hearing, defendant was 
once again admonished to get his support current and if 
not current the next time he appeared in court, his 
matters would be dismissed. (R 98) 
Numerous pleadings were filed with the Court over 
the next five years, but no hearing occurred until 
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June 24, 1992. This was a pre-trial on plaintiff's 
Petition for modification which also alleged the 
defendant's failure to pay child support for a period of 
thirteen months. (R 127-132) The pre-trial was continued 
to permit defendant time to file an Answer and 
Counterclaim regarding the issues of child support. 
(R 140) 
The continued pre-trial was not heard until 
January 13, 1993, at which time the Commissioner 
recommended the parties settle on a $2/500.00 compromised 
amount for delinquent child support. (R 165) 
Further pre-trial proceedings occurred on 
December 7, 1993 pursuant to plaintiff's Petition for 
modification and defendant's Counter-Petition for 
modification. The parties proffered their respective 
position and the Commissioner thereafter made 
recommendations which the parties accepted with some 
additional compromises. Based upon these compromises and 
agreements, the Court entered orders including: 
1. Defendant's child support was to be increased to 
$175.00 per month effective December, 1993. 
2. Delinquent child support was set at $4,000.00 
and defendant was to pay the delinquency within ten days 
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of the date of the hearing or no later than 
December 17, 1993. 
3. Judgment was entered against the defendant in 
the sum of $1,119.12 representing other debts he was 
ordered to pay in the Decree of divorce. He was ordered 
to pay that judgment at the rate of $100.00 per month 
effective January, 1994. 
4. Detailed visitation rights for the defendant 
which settled all prior disputes concerning visitation. 
That stipulated Order was signed by defendant's 
counsel "approved as to form" and signed by the Court as 
an order on December 20, 1993. (R 191-196) 
On January 10, 1994, plaintiff filed a Motion to set 
aside that stipulation because defendant had failed to 
pay the $4,000.00 delinquent child support he was ordered 
to pay by December 17, 1993. (R 197-199) 
Plaintiff's Motion was heard on January 26, 1994. 
At that hearing, the Commissioner signed an amended 
stipulated Order (modest language changes were made) and 
defendant agreed he would pay $4,100.00 to the plaintiff 
within ten days ($4,000.00 on delinquent child support 
judgment and $100.00 on the other judgment). The 
Commissioner also indicated that if the defendant failed 
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to pay the sum as agreed, plaintiff's counsel's affidavit 
would be sufficient grounds to set aside the stipulated 
order and refer the matter to trial. (R 207) 
The defendant paid the $4,000.00 delinquent child 
support judgment and a Satisfaction of Judgment was 
entered on February 9, 1994. (R 208) 
Two days after the January 26, 1994 hearing, the 
defendant signed a pro se Petition for modification of 
the Decree of divorce, claiming problems with visitation. 
Every issue raised in his Petition had been addressed by 
the Court in earlier hearings and settled by the 
January 26, 1994 Order. (R 210-219) 
Plaintiff filed a Motion to dismiss defendant's 
Petition and requested attorney fees and other sanctions, 
contending the Petition had been filed for no other 
purpose than to harass her and cause her to incur 
additional attorney fees. (R 225-227) 
There was a hearing before the Commissioner on 
April 12, 1994. The Court refused to modify the 
previously ordered visitation, but did recommend that the 
parties engage in counseling and encouraged them to reach 
an agreement concerning transportation relative to the 
plaintiff having moved forty-two miles from the defendant 
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following the last hearing. The Court said it would make 
a ruling on plaintiff's Motion to dismiss if the parties 
could not reach an agreement and the matter was continued 
without date. (R 231) 
By letter to the Commissioner dated June 13, 1994, 
the Commissioner was informed by plaintiff's counsel that 
defendant had failed to consider any agreement and asked 
the Court to issue a decision relative to plaintiff's 
Motion to dismiss and Request for sanctions. (R 233) 
The next hearing was on September 28, 1994. At that 
time, the Commissioner dismissed defendant's Petition for 
modification on the basis there had been no substantial 
change of circumstances and awarded plaintiff a judgment 
for attorney fees. The Court was informed that defendant 
had once again become delinquent in his child support and 
it was plaintiff's intent to file an Order to Show Cause 
in re contempt. Accordingly, the Commissioner said that 
if the defendant filed objections to the recommendations 
dismissing his Petition thereby transferring the matter 
to District Court, the plaintiff could file her Order to 
Show Cause directly with the District Court without first 
having the matter heard by the Commissioner. (R 241-242) 
On October 19, 1994, the plaintiff filed her 
11 
Affidavit for Order to Show Cause in re contempt 
allegingf among other things, that the defendant was five 
months delinquent in his child support and had only made 
one $100.00 payment on the judgment he was ordered to pay 
at the rate of $100.00 per month beginning January, 1994. 
(R 243-245) 
The defendant did not file objections to the 
Commissioner's recommendations. Instead, he filed a 
brand new Petition for modification. This time, the 
defendant added a new wrinkle and requested custody. 
(R 247-249) This maneuver kept all of the proceedings, 
including plaintiff's contempt Order to Show Cause, 
before the Commissioner. 
Defendant's new Petition for modification and 
plaintiff's Order to Show Cause in re contempt were heard 
by the Commissioner on June 19, 1995. As part of that 
hearing, the Commissioner interviewed the minor child in 
chambers. He then entered findings that there was no 
reason to consider defendant's Petition for modification. 
He found the defendant was once again in contempt in 
failing to pay child support, as well as the amount he 
was ordered to pay on the prior judgment. Findings were 
also made indicating defendant should be required to pay 
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some of plaintiff's attorney fees for having been drawn 
into the defendant's modification proceedings 
unnecessarily. Recommendations consistent with those 
findings were made and the matter was scheduled for trial 
before Judge Page. (R 273-274) 
At a hearing on November 6, 1995, Judge Page found 
the defendant was well aware of the order requiring him 
to pay $175.00 per month as child support, as well as the 
order requiring him to pay $100.00 per month on the 
additional judgment for marital debts. The Court found 
the defendant had missed five months child support prior 
to this hearing and his failure was wilful and 
contemptuous, but that he had purged this contempt by 
paying the delinquent child support just prior to the 
start of the hearing. The Court also found the defendant 
had only paid one $100.00 payment on the judgment he was 
ordered to pay at $100.00 per month and that his failure 
to pay the $100.00 per month was wilful and contemptuous. 
Based on that finding of contempt, the Court sentenced 
the defendant to jail for three days. The defendant was 
ordered to pay the balance of the judgment ($1,019.12) 
within ten days. The issue of custody was reserved 
subject to the completion of a child custody evaluation. 
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Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees. (R 294-300) 
The next hearing was held January 24, 1996. The 
custody evaluation had been completed and the 
recommendation of the evaluator was that custody would 
remain with the plaintiff. Accordingly, the defendant 
withdrew his Petition for modification requesting 
custody. It was determined that the defendant had failed 
to comply with the Court's earlier order to pay the 
$1,019.12 judgment within ten days, but that it was paid 
just a few days prior to the hearing. Plaintiff's 
request for additional attorney fees was taken under 
advisement. (R 308-310) 
Supplemental findings were issued March 11, 1996
 f 
granting plaintiff judgment against defendant for 
additional attorney fees. (R 324-326) 
By May, 1996, the defendant had once again become 
delinquent in his child support and plaintiff was forced 
to file a new Order to Show Cause in re contempt. 
(R 327-334) . She also requested some modification on the 
visitation rights because of problems between the minor 
child and the defendant. 
The contempt and modification matter was scheduled 
for hearing for July 3, 1996. (R 340) 
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On June 10, 1996, defendant filed his Affidavit of 
Disqualification claiming bias or prejudice on the part 
of Judge Page. (R 351-358) 
Although not legally required to do so, plaintiff 
filed a response to defendant's Affidavit of 
Disqualification. (R 365-370) 
Judge Page filed a response to the Affidavit denying 
any bias and certified the matter to Judge Memmott, the 
presiding judge, for determination. (R 379-380) 
Judge Memmott concluded that the Affidavit was 
legally insufficient and remanded the matter to Judge 
Page for further disposition and hearing. (R373-377) 
The hearing which is the subject matter of this 
appeal was held July 3, 1996. At this hearing, 
plaintiff's testimony was submitted by proffer of counsel 
which included representations that when plaintiff 
initiated her Order to Show Cause in re contempt for 
delinquent support, the defendant was two months 
delinquent but brought those months current shortly after 
having been served the Order. June's child support was 
delivered to plaintiff's counsel's office the day before 
the July 3, 1996 hearing. (R 398-399) The judge also 
visited with the minor child in chambers to discuss 
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problems with visitation. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant has failed to reference the record of 
this case supporting any of his claims of actual bias on 
the part of Judge Page. Judge Memmott reviewed 
defendant's Affidavit of Disqualification for legal 
sufficiency. He reviewed the record as he was permitted 
to do and concluded that the Affidavit was legally 
insufficient. His conclusion was not error. 
When the Court told the defendant that failure to 
make child support payments on time would constitute a 
separate contempt, it did not constitute a final order 
and therefore is not a valid issue on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT FOLLOWED CORRECT 
PROCEDURES WITH DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT 
OF DISQUALIFICATION. 
The defendant advances two theories in his claim 
that the trial Court should have disqualified itself for 
bias and prejudice. The first theory is premised upon 
the claim that the trial Court displayed actual bias and 
prejudice against the defendant and presumably should 
have recused himself without ever referring the matter to 
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another judge for ruling on the legal sufficiency of the 
Affidavit seeking disqualification. Defendant's Brief 
summarizes six allegations made by him in his Affidavit 
seeking disqualification which he claims are supportive 
of his contention that actual bias existed on the part of 
Judge Page. They are: 
(1) "The Court had precluded defendant's counsel 
from arguing a valid legal point." 
Defendant's Brief is void of any references to the 
record or transcript supporting this allegation. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that at an earlier hearing, 
defendant's counsel was advised by the judge to refrain 
from pursuing a line of argument. The nature of that 
argument and the judge's comments are not contained in 
this record, nor has defendant supported his allegations 
by citations to the record in accordance with Rule 24 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The claim should 
be summarily rejected. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of 
Cal., 746 P.2d 1182, 11984-1185 (Utah App. 1987). 
(2) "The Court had previously sentenced the 
defendant to jail for contempt in the same matter." 
Once again, the defendant has failed to make any 
reference to the record in support of this allegation. 
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The plaintiff acknowledges that defendant had previously 
been sentenced to three days in jail for his contempt. 
This was because of the defendant's failure to comply 
with a lawful order, an order to which he had previously 
stipulated. (R 294-300) 
The mere fact that the defendant has previously been 
found in contempt for violating a court's order does not 
automatically thereafter disqualify the trial judge from 
ever hearing a matter involving the same defendant. In 
domestic matters it is not uncommon for a trial judge to 
be assigned to the same case throughout its history and 
to consider allegations and issues of contempt on a 
repeated basis. 
(3) "The Court was openly critical of defendant's 
parenting style." 
The only record reference in defendant's Brief on 
this issue relates to a comment made by Judge Page at the 
hearing after defendant had filed his Affidavit seeking 
disqualification. There is no record reference to any 
comments by Judge Page preceding the time defendant filed 
his Affidavit. 
The comment referenced in defendant's Brief was made 
following the Judge's interview of the minor child in 
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chambers (R 449-455) and evidence at the hearing that 
when the defendant questioned the minor child concerning 
visitation with his mother and didn't like his answer, he 
required him to do ten push-ups while traveling the 
highway between Ogden and Coalville (R433) and then had 
him do another ten push-ups following the first ten (R 
433). Defendant said he had his son do these push-ups 
"because he was being stubborn and arrogant and because 
his definition was inconsistent with Webster's definition 
of the word negotiation, I made him do ten push-ups". (R 
434) 
(4) "The Court invited further ex parte 
communication with defendant's son". 
Once again, the defendant has failed to make any 
reference to the record in support of this allegation. 
(5) "The Court circumvented its customary and usual 
practices". 
Defendant fails to articulate any facts or evidence 
supporting this allegation, nor are there any references 
to the record suggesting that customary and usual 
practices were circumvented. 
(6) "The Court made findings of fact contrary to 
the parties' stipulation". 
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Here again, the defendant fails to articulate any 
facts or evidence supporting this allegation, nor are 
there any references to the record suggesting that 
findings of fact were made contrary to the parties' 
stipulation. 
Defendant's second theory in support of his claim 
that the trial Court erred in failing to disqualify 
itself is premised upon the claim that Judge Memmott 
improperly reviewed defendant's Affidavit for legal 
sufficiency. In this regard, defendant relies upon Young 
v. Patterson, 922 P.2d 1280 (Utah App. 1996). 
Defendant claims that Judge Memmott weighed evidence 
and did not limit its review to the legal sufficiency of 
defendant's Affidavit. Judge Memmott's Ruling on 
defendant's motion for disqualification is appended to 
defendant's Brief. It is obvious that Judge Memmott 
understood the scope and limitation of his review. 
In analyzing the defendant's Affidavit, Judge 
Memmott did nothing more than review the record to see if 
it supported defendant's allegations. A review of 
pertinent parts of the record is appropriate under the 
holding of Young, supra. 
Given the history of this case which has been 
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recited in detail in this Brieff Judge Memmott's 
conclusion was accurate wherein he said: "In reviewing 
the totality of defendant's Affidavit, it appears to this 
C|0urt that the defendant appears dissatisfied with the 
prior rulings of Judge Page and is using this motion to 
disqualify him from the case because of his 
dissatisfaction with prior rulings rather than on the 
basis of bias and prejudice". (R 377) 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S COMMENT CONCERNING PROSPECTIVE 
CONTEMPTUOUS BEHAVIOR WAS NOT A FINAL ORDER 
SUBJECT TO APPELLATE REVIEW. 
At the conclusion of the July 3, 1996 hearing, the 
Cburt said: 
Child support from here on will remain 
at the same level. The Court's feeling 
is that the plaintiff has failed to 
meet its burden to show a change of 
circumstances. That doesn't mean that 
that can't be brought back to the 
Court's attention if, in fact, evidence 
is obtainable to that extent. 
Those payments are to be made through 
the clerk of the court by the 5th day 
of each month. If they have not been 
deposited in the — with the court 
clerk by the 10th of each month, a 
bench warrant will issue. 
Mr. Edwards you understand what that is? 
Mr. Edwards: Yes sir. 
21 
Court finds that you're in contempt of 
court for failure to pay child support 
on time and for failure to pay each 
month as previously ordered by the 
Court. The Court will sentence you to 
thirty days in the Davis County Jail. 
I will stay the imposition of that 
sentence, contingent upon your payment 
of the support as previously ordered. 
Every month you fail to make the payment 
on time will be a separate contempt. 
So you have one thirty-day commitment 
right now. If there are any future, 
any of those contempts will be added 
on to that thirty-day period. 
The Court will find that you were in 
arrears when this Affidavit was filed 
and you should be required to pay a 
reasonable attorneys fee. I'll order 
that you pay $250.00 to your ex-wife 
for the benefit of her attorney. 
The Court will order that that be 
added to the prior judgment and that 
you be ordered to pay $50.00 per 
month towards that judgment and that's 
to be paid along with your attorney 
fees — or excuse me, the support, 
through the clerk of the court. And 
that will begin with the month of 
July, so you have until the 10th of 
July to make those payments. 
(R 459-461) 
Defendant claims that this is a prospective finding 
of contempt. Plaintiff suggests that it is nothing more 
than the Court's comments upon the defendant's obligation 
to pay child support timely and the process that will 
follow in the event defendant fails to pay. 
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Pursuant to 30-3-10.6(1)(a), Utah Code Annotated, 
each payment of child support under any child support 
order is, on and after the date it is due, a judgment 
with the same attributes and affect of any judgment of a 
district court. Pursuant to 78-32-1(5), Utah Code 
Annotated, disobedience of any lawful judgment is a 
contempt of court. 
Judge Page did nothing more than inform the 
defendant as to the status of the law. He did not 
preclude the defendant from any entitlement to a hearing, 
nor did Judge Page make any orders which were final and 
therefore appealable. This issue is without merit or 
substance. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
The plaintiff seeks her attorney fees incurred on 
this appeal. She was awarded fees in the proceeding 
below and ordinarily when fees are awarded in the 
litigation below to the party who then prevails on 
appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on 
appeal. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 
1990. 
CONCLUSION 
By initiating this appeal, defendant has 
23 
demonstrated nothing more than his propensity to refuse 
to accept lawful court orders, pursue litigation when 
orders are not to his liking and raise invalid and 
nonmeritorious claims. The appeal should be dismissed. 
Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of 
January, 1997. 
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